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NGO Involvement in the WTO 
 
A lawyer’s perspective on a glass half-full or half-empty? 
 
Peter Van den Bossche
1
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The importance of non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’) as international actors has 
increased sharply over the last decades.  Since 1945, when NGOs were explicitly recognised as 
actors on the international scene by Article 71 of the United Nations Charter, NGOs have 
become an ever stronger and more vocal force in international policy-making, policy-
implementation, compliance-monitoring and dispute-settlement. The interest and involvement of 
NGOs in the activities of international organisations has especially intensified since the early 
1990s. At present, a continuously growing number of NGOs participates, or aspires to 
participate, in the work of international organisations. Many observers would agree with K. 
Raustiala  that ‘this growth of NGO activity may indicate an emerging transformation of the 
international legal and political system – a decline in the importance of the sovereign state and 
the state system and an accompanying rise of governance by a dynamic global civil society.’
2
  
 
The most important reason for the empowerment of NGOs on the international plane is the 
phenomenon of globalisation and the growing need to find solutions for global problems. This 
has lead governments to engage in more negotiation, policy formation, and decision-making at 
the international level. More often than not, these activities at the international level have 
significant effects on domestic policy and legislation. In a number of fields there has, in fact, 
been a shift in the regulatory activity from the national to the international level. Consequently, 
many NGOs, which were formerly national in focus and organisational structure, have 
‘internationalised’ in order to maintain their ability to participate in the policy debate and affect 
policy decisions.
3
 
 
                                                 
1
 Professor of International Economic Law and Head of the Department of International and European Law, Maastricht University; 
former Counsellor and Acting Director, WTO Appellate Body Secretariat, Geneva.  The author is much indebted to Dr. Sergey 
Ripinsky, formerly of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University, currently of the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, London. The author also thanks Nina Buttgen for her able assistance. This paper was presented on 25 October 2006 at the 
Institute of European Studies of the Free University of Brussels in the context of the IES Lecture Series Autumn 2006.  For a further 
discussion of the issues dealt with in this paper, please refer to P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2005, reprinted 2006), 737 p. 
2
 K. Raustiala, ‘The “Participatory Revolution” in International Environmental Law’, 21 The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 
1997, 537, at 539. 
3
 See K. Nowrot, ‘Symposium, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization: Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of 
Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law’, 6 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 1999, 579, at 586-7. 
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As noted in the Cardoso Report of 2004 on the relationship between the United Nations and civil 
society, globalisation renders traditional forms of representation increasingly less relevant.
4
 This 
is because economics, trade, communications and culture are becoming more global, with more 
decisions being reached in international forums and organisations, whereas representative 
democracy remains essentially national and local. The Report suggests that as a result 
‘[r]epresentative democracy, in which citizens periodically elect their representatives across the 
full spectrum of political issues, is now supplemented by participatory democracy, in which 
anyone can enter the debates that most interest them, through advocacy, protest and in other 
ways.’
 5
 People are using internationally operating NGOs to express their political views and/or 
promote their interests. Effective involvement in – and influence over - the policy-making, 
policy-implementation, compliance-monitoring and/or dispute-settlement activities of 
international organizations is a chief objective – if not the raison d’être – of international NGOs. 
 
International NGOs have definitely been quite keen to be involved in the activities of the World 
Trade Organization (‘WTO’). As the primary international organisation concerned with trans-
border trade, the WTO is at the forefront of the multilateral effort to manage and regulate economic 
globalisation. The law of the WTO governs the trade relations between its 149 Members and plays a 
crucial role in resolving trade disputes between these Members. Not surprisingly the WTO has 
emerged as a prime target for anti-globalist protest. When Mike Moore arrived at the headquarters 
of the World Trade Organization in the summer 1999 to begin his first day of work as the WTO’s 
new Director General, he was welcomed by a small but noisy group of demonstrators.  One of the 
demonstrators waved a sign saying ‘Dieu est mort, l’OMC l’a remplacé!’ (God is dead; the WTO 
has replaced him!).  Another sign said ‘Qui sème la misère récolte la colère!’ (He who sows misery 
will reap anger) and a third sign said ‘WTO = World Terror Organization’. This small 
demonstration was a sign on the wall of things to come. A few months later, the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Seattle triggered large-scale demonstrations that degenerated in street battles between 
the police and protestors. After Seattle, there were several other mass demonstrations against the 
WTO, most recently in Hong Kong in December 2005 at the occasion of the bi-annual meeting of 
the WTO Ministerial Conference. As G. de Jonquières observed, this ‘interest’ in the WTO reflects 
‘growing public awareness – but often imperfect understanding – of its role in promoting, and 
formulating rules for, global economic integration’.
6
  
 
This paper examines the nature and the extent of the involvement of NGOs in the activities of the 
WTO. First, it looks at the arguments for and against NGO involvement in WTO activities. Next, 
the paper discusses the legal basis for the involvement of NGOs in WTO activities and the 
various forms of involvement provided for. It compares the position of NGOs in the WTO with 
their position in other international organisations, and in particular the United Nations. 
Subsequently, the paper explores the practice of WTO engagement with NGOs. Finally, the 
paper examines and compares the rules and procedures of the WTO and the United Nations 
respectively for the selection of the NGOs with which to engage.  
 
                                                 
4
 Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the People, Civil Society, the United 
Nations and Global Governance (Cardoso Report), A/58/817, dated 11 June 2004, available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/pdf/N0437641.pdf?OpenElement, visited on 15 August 2005. 
5
 Ibid, para. 13. 
6
 G. de Jonquières, ‘The WTO’s Capacity to Arouse Controversy Highlights a Growing Public Awareness of its Role’, Financial Times, 24 
September 1999. 
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II. Arguments for and against NGO involvement 
 
While not always wholeheartedly, international organizations have responded positively to the 
call of NGOs for more involvement and currently allow – to different extents and in different 
ways – NGOs to participate in their activities. This has also been the case for the WTO. 
However, the debate on the desirability of (greater) involvement of NGOs in the work of the 
WTO is all but settled.  
 
There are four main arguments in favour of (greater) NGO involvement in WTO activities (as 
well as in the activities of most other international organisations). First, NGO participation will 
enhance the WTO decision-making process because NGOs will provide information, arguments 
and perspectives that governments do not bring forward. NGOs have a wealth of specialised 
knowledge, resources and analytical capacity. As Daniel Esty noted, NGOs can and should 
function as 'intellectual competitors' to governments in the quest for optimal policies.
7
 In fact, 
governments often lack the resources and very specific expertise necessary to investigate certain 
issues. NGOs may frequently be of help, enhancing the resources and expertise available and 
enriching the policy debate.  
 
Secondly, NGO participation will increase the legitimacy of the WTO. In the eyes of many, the 
WTO is currently a secretive organisation in which the governments (of a few major trading 
nations), unsupervised by parliaments or civil society, set the agenda and push through rules that 
affect the welfare of people worldwide. WTO decision-making has been described as 
undemocratic and lacking transparency. For decision-making to be democratic, it must involve 
either directly or, more likely, through representation those that will be affected by the decisions 
taken. Furthermore, decisions must be reached as a result of an open and transparent exchange of 
rational arguments which allows those represented to ‘watch-dog’ the representatives.
8
 The 
legitimacy of the WTO and public confidence in the WTO will increase when NGOs have the 
opportunity to be heard and to observe the decision-making process. NGOs will contribute to 
ensuring that decisions result from the open exchange of rational arguments rather than from 
shady bargaining. Moreover, NGOs can play an important role in disseminating information at 
the national level, ensuring broader public support and understanding.  
 
Thirdly, transnational interests and concerns may not be adequately represented by any national 
government. By allowing NGO involvement in WTO discussions, the WTO would hear about 
important issues which are international in nature. 
 
Finally, civil society participation in the debate at the national level is only an option in those 
WTO Members with open and democratic processes at the national level. This is not the case for 
all WTO Members. Hearing NGOs at the WTO can thus compensate for the fact that NGOs are 
not always and everywhere heard at the national level. 
 
There are equally four main arguments against (greater) involvement of NGOs in the work of 
the WTO. First, NGO involvement may lead the decision-making process to be captured by 
                                                 
7
 See D. Esty, 'Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion', Journal 
of International Economic Law, 1998,136. 
8
 See M. Krajewski, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law’, Journal of World Trade, 2001, 167-86. 
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special interests.
9
 Trade liberalisation produces diffuse and hard-to-quantify benefits for the 
general public while producing visible harm to specific and well-organised interests. The NGOs 
seeking access to the WTO are often entities representing special interests, not the interests of the 
general public. Thus, special interests may gain undue influence. 
 
Secondly, many NGOs lack legitimacy. They are neither accountable to an electorate nor 
representative in a general way. NGOs typically advocate relatively narrow interests. Unlike 
governments, they do not balance all of society's interests. It is legitimate to ask questions 
regarding the actual constituency of an NGO and its financial backing. 
 
Thirdly, most developing-country Members object to greater involvement of NGOs in the WTO 
because they view most NGOs, and in particular NGOs focusing on environmental or labour 
issues, as inimical to their interests. Moreover, NGOs of industrialised Members tend to be well 
organised and well financed. Allowing NGOs a bigger role may therefore further marginalise 
developing-country Members within the WTO decision-making process. In other words, it may 
tilt the negotiating balance further to their disadvantage. 
 
Finally, WTO decision-making, with its consensus requirement, is already very difficult. NGO 
involvement will make negotiations and decision-making even more difficult. Further 
transparency will enable private interest groups to frustrate the negotiating powers of 
governments in WTO forums. Gary Sampson noted in this respect that ‘national representatives 
must on occasion subordinate certain national interests in order to achieve marginally acceptable 
or sub-optimal compromises that, by definition, require trade-offs. Doubt is expressed whether 
such a system could continue to work effectively if these trade-offs were open to scrutiny by 
precisely those special interest groups that would have opposed them.’
10
 
 
The essence of the debate on the pro’s and con’s of (greater) NGO involvement in international 
organisations was captured well by the authors of  the Background Paper for the Cardoso Report 
when they concluded that ‘well handled’ involvement of NGOs in the policy-deliberation and 
decision-making processes of international organizations ‘enhances the quality of decision-
making, increases ownership of the decisions, improves accountability and transparency of the 
process and enriches outcomes through a variety of views and experiences’.
11
 However, ‘handled 
badly, it can confuse choices, hamper the intergovernmental search for common ground, erode 
the privacy needed for sensitive discussions, over-crowd agendas and present distractions at 
important meetings’. 
 
The remainder of this paper will examine how the WTO ‘handles’ the involvement of NGOs in 
its activities and will compare this ‘handling’ with that by other international organisations 
 
                                                 
9
 See J. Dunoff, 'The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO', Journal of International Economic Law, 1998, 437 
(reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press). 
10
 G. Sampson, 'Overview', in G. Sampson (ed.), The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance (United Nations 
University Press, 2001), 11. 
11
 UN System and Civil Society: An Inventory and Analysis of Practices, Background Paper for the Secretary-General’s Panel of 
Eminent Persons on United Nations Relations with Civil Society, Introduction, May 2003. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/reform/pdfs/hlp9.htm, visited on 1 April 2005. 
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III. Legal Basis for and Forms of NGO Involvement 
 
 
The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the ‘WTO Agreement’) 
explicitly empowers the WTO to engage with NGOs. Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement 
provides: 
 
The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultations and cooperation 
with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO. 
 
Such explicit empowerment to engage with NGOs can also be found in the UN Charter.  Article 
71 of the UN Charter states:  
 
The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. 
 
Also the constituent instruments of other international organisations, such as the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) and the International Labour Organization 
(‘ILO’), explicitly provide for engagement with NGOs. Note, however, that the constituent 
instruments of two international organizations with which the WTO has particularly close links 
and a shared responsibility for coherence in global economic policy-making,
12
 namely the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (‘World Bank’) and the International 
Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), do not provide for a legal basis for NGO involvement. While the latter 
did not prevent the World Bank and the IMF from engaging with NGOs,
13
 it is to be applauded 
that the WTO was explicitly empowered to engage with NGOs. The 1948 Havana Charter on 
the International Trade Organization (‘ITO’) contained a provision with wording similar to 
Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement.
14
 The ITO, however, never became operational and the 
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) filled the gap left by the ITO for almost 
fifty years. The GATT, by contrast, did not have any provision on cooperation with NGOs. 
Under the GATT, informal and ad hoc contacts existed with NGOs. However, NGOs were 
denied access to meetings and conferences. That was also the case for the Marrakesh Conference 
in April 1994, at which the WTO Agreement was signed.
15
 
 
Pursuant to the mandate given to it in Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement, the General Council of 
the WTO adopted in 1996 the Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations (the ‘1996 Guidelines’).
16
  In this one-page document Members recognised that 
NGOs can play a role ‘to increase the awareness of the public in respect of WTO activities’ and 
that NGOs are a ‘valuable resource’ that can ‘contribute to the accuracy and richness of the public 
debate’.
17
 In the 1996 Guidelines, it was agreed that interaction with NGOs should be developed 
through the organisation of symposia for NGOs on specific WTO-related issues; informal 
                                                 
12
 See Article III:5 of the WTO Agreement. 
13
 Both the World Bank and the IMF take the position that engagement with NGOs is permissible as long as the general provisions 
of their Articles of Agreement are observed. 
14
 See Article 87(2) of the Havana Charter on the International Trade Organization. 
15
 NGOs as such were not invited to Marrakesh; those NGOs present were registered as members of the press. 
16
 Decision by the General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, 
dated 23 July 1996. 
17
 Ibid., paras. II and IV. 
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arrangements to receive the information NGOs may wish to make available for consultation by 
interested delegations; the continuation of past practice of the WTO Secretariat of responding to 
requests for general information and briefings about the WTO, and participation of chairpersons of 
WTO councils and committees in discussions and meetings with NGOs in their personal 
capacity.
18
  
 
The 1996 Guidelines also made the limits of NGO involvement clear. In the concluding 
paragraph, the General Council referred to the special character of the WTO, which is both an 
intergovernmental organisation based on a binding treaty of rights and obligations among its 
Members and a forum for negotiations. The General Council then concluded: 
 
As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would not 
be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.
 19
  
 
To this, the General Council added: 
 
Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through 
appropriate processes at the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into 
account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-
making.
20
 
 
While Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement allows the General Council to provide for fully-
fledged involvement of NGOs in WTO activities, the General Council opted in 1996 to transfer 
the main responsibility for engaging with civil society to the national level. Furthermore, the 
General Council instructed only the WTO Secretariat to engage with NGOs and effectively 
barred NGOs from participation in the activities of WTO bodies. While the legal basis in the 
WTO Agreement is broad enough to allow for this, NGOs do not have consultative status in any 
WTO bodies. 
 
Although Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement and Article 71 of the UN Charter both empower in 
very similar wording
21
  their respective organisations to engage with NGOs, there is a world of 
difference in what they did, and do, with this mandate. Unlike the WTO, the United Nations and 
in particular the UN Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) has seized the opportunity to 
provide for forms of significant involvement.  Pursuant to the mandate given to ECOSOC in 
Article 71 of the UN Charter, it adopted on 25 July 1996 Resolution 1996/31 on the 
‘Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations’.
22
 
This instrument is much more elaborate and provides for notably broader NGO involvement than 
the WTO 1996 Guidelines. Resolution 1996/31 provides for the granting of ‘consultative status’ 
to NGOs. There are three types of such status: general consultative status; special consultative 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., paras. IV and V. 
19
 Ibid., para. VI. 
20
 Ibid., para. VI. 
21
 Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement: ‘…make appropriate arrangements for consultations and cooperation with non-governmental 
organizations concerned with matters …’;  and Article 71 of the UN Charter: ‘may make suitable arrangements for consultation with 
non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters …’. 
22
 Resolution 1996/312 of the Economic and Social Council of 5 July 1996 on the ‘Consultative Relationship between the United 
Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations’, UN Document E/1996/31, available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm. Resolution 1996/31 updated the arrangements previously set out 
in Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968. 
 
 
 
 9 
status, and inclusion on the Roster. Each type of status corresponds with a different bundle of 
rights. An NGO in general consultative status: 
• is informed of the provisional agenda of  the  Economic and Social Council and may 
propose to the Council Committee on Non-governmental Organizations (NGO 
Committee) that the Committee request the UN Secretary-General to place items of 
special interest on the provisional agenda of the Council;
23
 
• may orally present to the Council introductory statements of an expository nature on 
items included on the Council’s agenda at the proposal of the NGO;
24
 
• may sit as an observer at public meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies;25 
• may submit written statements with a maximum of 2000 words for circulation to the 
Members of the Council;
26
 and 
• may make oral statements to the Council (at the recommendation of the NGO Committee 
and subject to the approval of the Council).
27
 
 
NGOs in special consultative status enjoy some of the same rights granted to NGOs in general 
consultative status
28
. However, they cannot propose to place items on the agenda of the Council, 
nor can they make oral statements at meetings of the Council.
29
 They may, however, speak at 
meetings of the Council’s subsidiary bodies that deal with subject matters of specific interest to 
them.
30
 Lastly, NGOs on the Roster are informed of the provisional agenda of the Council and 
may attend the meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies concerned with matters within 
their field of competence.
31
 NGOs on the Roster are consulted at the request of the Council or its 
subsidiary bodies.
32
 Resolution 1996/31 authorises NGOs in any type of consultative status to 
confer with officers of the UN Secretariat, and visa-versa.
33
 Additionally, the Secretary-General 
is authorised to offer facilities to NGOs in any type of consultative status including: access to 
UN grounds, facilities (including conference space) and UN press documentation services and 
arrangement of informal discussions on relevant special interest topics.
34
 Note that even the least 
privileged category of NGOs interacting with the Council (the category of ‘NGOs on the 
Roster’) has significantly more ‘participation’ rights than are granted to NGOs under the 1996 
Guidelines of the WTO General Council.  
 
IV. Practice of WTO Engagement with NGOs 
 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., paras. 27-28. 
24
 Ibid., para. 32 (b). 
25
 Ibid., paras. 29 and 35. 
26
 Ibid., para. 30. 
27
 Ibid., para.32 (a). 
28
 They are informed of the provisional agenda of the Council (ibid., para. 27); they may sit as observers at public meetings of the 
Council and its subsidiary bodies (ibid., paras. 29 and 35); and they may submit written statements with a maximum of 500 words 
for circulation to the Members of the Council (ibid., para. 31 (e)). 
29
 Ibid., para. 38 (a). 
30
 Ibid., para. 32 (a). 
31
 Ibid., paras. 27 and 29. 
32
 Ibid., para. 24. 
33
 Such consultations may be conducted upon the request of the NGO or upon the request of the Secretary-General (ibid., para. 65). 
Also, the UN Secretary-General may request an accredited NGO to carry out specific studies or prepare specific papers (ibid., 
para.66). 
34
 Ibid., para. 67. 
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There is often a marked difference between, on the one hand, the forms of NGO involvement 
provided for in the constituent and/or secondary legal instruments of an international 
organization and, on the other hand, the practice of NGO involvement in the activities of that 
international organization or the engagement of that organization with NGOs. A prime example 
of such difference is the engagement of the World Bank and the IMF with NGOs. This 
engagement is not provided for in any legal instrument and yet, this engagement is – albeit 
limited – a reality. Also the involvement of NGOs in the activities of the United Nations goes 
beyond what is provided for in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 as a practice has evolved to allow 
for a certain degree of informal participation by NGOs in the work of the General Assembly’s 
main committees and several of its subsidiary bodies, as well as in special sessions of the 
Assembly.
35
  
 
In practice, the principal forms of WTO engagement with NGOs at present are: 
• attendance of the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference; 
• public symposia and forums on WTO-related issues;  
• access to WTO information; 
• opportunities for information exchange; 
• informal meetings with NGO; 
• the Informal NGO Advisory Body; and 
• involvement in dispute settlement.  
  
 
1. Attendance of the plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference 
 
While its 1996 Guidelines of July 1996 did not provide for this, the General Council decided in 
the run-up to the first Session of the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 
1996 that NGOs would be invited to attend the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial 
Conference. It was also decided that an NGO Centre with facilities for organizing meetings and 
workshops would be set up alongside the official Conference Centre in Singapore. The 108 
NGOs that attended the first Session of the Ministerial Conference, did, however, not have 
observer status; they were not allowed to make any oral statements at, or submit written 
statements to, the meetings they could attend. Since the Singapore Session, the number of NGOs 
represented has increased with each Session, with the exception of the Doha Session, when 
limited local facilities (and other restrictions) did not allow a large number of NGOs. For the 
Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial Conference in December 2005, the number of accredited 
NGOs had reached 1065, of which 836 actually attended.  
 
 
Trend in NGO Representation at Sessions of the Ministerial Conference36 
 
 Number of NGOs attended 
                                                 
35
 See Reference document on the participation of civil society in United Nations conferences and special sessions of the General 
Assembly during the 1990s, version 1 August 2001, prepared by the Office of the President of the Millennium Assembly, 55th 
session of the United Nations General Assembly, available at http://www.un.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsociety1.htm, paras. 13-
20. 
36
 See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/ngo_minconf_6oct03_e.htm, visited on 8 February 2004 and 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/list_ngo_hk05_e.pdf, visited on 12 October 2006. 
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accredited NGOs 
Singapore 1996 159 108 
Geneva 1998 153 128 
Seattle 1999 776 686 
Doha 2001 651 370 
Cancún 2003 961 795 
Hong Kong 2005 1065 836 
 
Although the attendance of the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference has now 
become a well-established practice, there is no standing legal arrangement for the participation of 
NGOs in these meetings yet. For each Session of the Ministerial Conference, the General 
Council has to agree on NGO attendance and determine the modalities of this attendance.
37
 As 
for the previous Sessions, the attendance by NGOs of meetings of the Ministerial Conference at 
the Hong Kong Session in December 2005 was limited to the formal plenary meeting of the 
Ministerial Conference. Note that at such meeting little more happens than the reading out by 
heads of government or trade ministers of short prepared statements of a general nature. NGOs 
are not allowed to make any statement, whether orally or in writing, to the Ministerial 
Conference. The fact that the formal plenary meetings of the Ministerial Conference are now 
web-casted makes the right of NGOs to attend them even less meaningful. Access to all other 
meetings, including of course negotiating sessions, is denied. As at previous Sessions, NGOs 
were also at the Hong Kong Session provided with an NGO centre, equipped with office and 
media facilities, and were briefed about the conference developments by WTO Secretariat 
officials. Note, however, that to improve transparency and inclusiveness, in Hong Kong, for the 
first time, NGOs were accommodated under the same roof as the delegates of the WTO 
Members.
38
 
 
 
2. Public symposia and forums 
 
As provided for by the 1996 Guidelines, in the second half of 1990’s a number of symposia for 
NGOs and delegations of Members on specific issues was organised by the WTO Secretariat. 
Three of these symposia concerned the issue of trade and the environment, one the issue of trade 
and development and one the issue of trade facilitation.
39
 These first symposia were organised in 
a form of plenary sessions with hundreds of participants gathered in one room. Such format was 
criticised as ineffective because it resulted in poorly focused discussions and overly general 
conclusions.
40
 
 
                                                 
37
 For the latest of these decisions, see WTO Ministerial Conference, Procedures Regarding Registration and Attendance of Non-
Governmental Organizations at the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(05)/INF/6, dated 1 June 2005. 
38
 The NGOs were provided with an entire floor with support staff and copying equipment, a computer room, and about 10 meeting 
rooms for purposes of their lobbying activities and meetings. NGOs were also provided with an information hall, where the WTO 
proceedings and briefings as well as the daily NGO meetings programme were on video-display throughout the day, and where 
relevant NGO literature could be displayed and made available on a continuous basis. The information hall was visited by hundreds 
of delegates during the conference proceedings. See Esmé D. du Plessis, Co-Chair Committee Q94, Report to AIPPI (February 
2006), p. 7, available at http://www.aippi.org/reports/q94/report_wto_6th_ministerialconf.pdf, visited on 18 October 2006. 
39
 See http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/intro_e.htm, visited on 1 November 2005. 
40
 See S. Charnovitz, ‘Opening the WTO to Non-Governmental Interests’,  24 Fordham International Law Journal, 2000,  173, at 
191, 214; G. Marceau and P. Pedersen, ‘The World Trade Organization and Civil Society’,  33 Journal of World Trade, 1999,  5,  at 
18. 
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In reaction to this criticism, in 2000 the WTO changed the format of symposia and has now 
turned them into annual 2- or 3-day events featuring many separate workshops and seminars 
where panellists and interested participants discuss a broad range of topical WTO-related issues. 
These annual symposia are financed from extra-budgetary sources, in particular voluntary 
contributions of WTO Members, such as Norway. 
 
Since 2005, the WTO does not exercise control anymore over issues to be discussed, speakers, 
panellists or other participants. Its role in the organisation of these symposia is now confined to 
matters such as arranging for rooms, interpretation and financial support to speakers from 
developing countries. Themes of seminars and workshops that constitute the symposium are 
suggested by NGOs themselves (and other organisers such as academic institutions). Any NGO 
may approach the WTO Secretariat with a suggestion to organise a workshop on a particular 
issue of interest to it. The NGO itself then determines the speaker(s) and/or the panellists. The 
WTO does not interfere with this process. As up to five or six workshops can take place 
simultaneously, this creates a refreshing competitive atmosphere between NGOs (and other 
organisers) who are all competing for the attention of the participants to the Symposium. 
 
At the WTO Public Symposium of May 2004 on “Multilateralism at the Crossroads”, there were 
almost 1,200 registered participants and 150 speakers. This three-day event featured a total of 29 
workshops on the agricultural negotiations, on the prospects for developing countries after the 
failure of the Cancún Session of the Ministerial Conference, on trade liberalisation and 
sustainable development, on the environment and biodiversity, on South-South cooperation and 
on the challenges presented by regional trade agreements.
41
 
 
At the WTO Public Symposium of April 2005 on ‘WTO After 10 Years: Global Problems and 
Multilateral Solutions’, most of the discussions focused on the Doha Development Round 
negotiations, with much attention devoted to agricultural trade. Some 23 workshops were held on 
a wide variety of themes, with between 5 to 6 concurrent sessions held each morning or 
afternoon. 
 
At the WTO Public Forum of September 2006 on ‘What WTO for the XXIst century?’, there 
were 1 532 registered participants, among which many NGO representatives but also academics, 
business representatives and officials of international organisations.  
 
Breakdown by category of the on-line registered participants for the 2006 Public Forum42 
                  
 
                                                 
41
 A. Lofthouse and F. Jubany, Report for International Trade Canada on WTO Public Symposium ‘Multilateralism at the Crossroads’ 
(June 2004). Available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/WTO-NGO-en.asp, visited on 1 November 2005. 
42
 See http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum_e/forum06_e.htm visited on 16 October 2006. Note that 1396 participants 
registered on-line for the 2006 Public Forum. An 136 additional people were registered manually after the expiry date of the on-line 
registration. 
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The public symposia or - as they seem to have been re-baptised in 2006 – public forums do not 
lead to any specific outcomes, such as, for example, a civil society statement to the WTO 
Ministerial Conference or General Council. While in the context of other international 
organisations, similar meetings of representatives of civil society organisations have in the past 
lead to civil society statements, this is not the ambition of the WTO public symposia and forums. 
Their aims have been more modest, namely to facilitate the exchange of views and perspectives 
on WTO issues in a frank and open way and to allow participants to network and establish 
contacts. In view of these aims, the lukewarm participation of diplomats and other government 
officials of WTO Members has been a source of frustration for NGOs. 
 
 
3. Access to WTO information 
 
In the absence of a right to attend meetings of WTO bodies, the right of access to documents 
produced in the course of, and in relation to, these meetings becomes essential for NGOs that 
wish to keep WTO activities under scrutiny. In parallel with the 1996 Guidelines, the General 
Council adopted procedures for the de-restriction and circulation of WTO documents, 
establishing the basic principle that most documents would be immediately circulated as 
unrestricted. However, this principle was, at the time, still subject to important exceptions. In 
particular, working documents, minutes of WTO meetings, WTO Secretariat background papers 
and Ministerial Conference summary records were only de-restricted, and thus made available to 
the public, after eight to nine months. In 2002, after years of discussion, the General Council 
reached a decision to accelerate de-restriction of official WTO documents, cutting the time 
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period in which most documents are made publicly available to 6-12 weeks, and also reducing 
significantly the list of exceptions.
43
  
 
Therefore, today most WTO documents are immediately available to NGOs and the public at 
large, and those documents that are initially restricted are de-restricted much faster. All 
unrestricted WTO documents have been made available online, in all three official WTO 
languages (English, French and Spanish). 
 
Further, since 1998, the External Relations Division of the WTO Secretariat has been organising 
briefings for NGOs on meetings of WTO bodies. Normally, NGO briefings are held after 
meetings of the General Council and of the Trade Negotiations Committee. Usually between 20 
and 30 NGOs attend them. They are mostly NGOs with an office in Geneva.
44
 If there are other 
NGOs that would like to attend, they have to send a request to the External Relations Division.
45
  
 
 
4. Opportunities for information exchange 
 
Since 1998, the WTO website has a special NGO-page ‘For NGOs’.
46
 This page holds specific 
information on NGO-related WTO activities (such as the Public Symposia and Forums) and on 
NGO participation in past (and future) Sessions of the Ministerial Conference (including 
announcements of registration procedures and deadlines).  
 
Furthermore, the WTO Secretariat, and in particular the External Relations Division thereof, 
compiles – also since 1998 – a monthly list of position papers it receives from NGOs. This list is 
circulated to the WTO Members. A copy of any of these NGO position papers can be obtained 
from the WTO Secretariat. All NGO position papers received are also posted on the NGO-page 
of the WTO website and can easily been downloaded. The WTO Secretariat only includes in the 
monthly list and posts on the NGO-page, position papers relating to WTO issues and activities.
47
 
The September 2006 List included position papers on ‘Redressing Trade and Development 
Imbalances Remains an Urgent Task’ from the Fair Trade Alliance (Philippines); on ‘The 
Evolving Debate on Trade and Labour Standards’ from the International Organization of 
Employers (Switzerland); and on ‘Review of the EU Agricultural Distorting Supports to Rebuild 
Fair and Sustainable Agricultural Trade Rules after the Doha Round Hibernation’ from 
Solidarité (France). The WTO Secretariat reserves the full right not to include on the list, 
material which, in its opinion, does not relate to WTO issues or activities. 
 
 
5. Informal meetings with NGOs 
                                                 
43
 Decision of the General Council, Procedures for the Circulation and De-restriction of WTO Documents, WT/L/452, dated 16 May 
2002. 
44
 The WTO informs Geneva-based NGOs about the briefings by email. 
45
 Having satisfied itself that it is indeed an NGO, the External Relations Division includes the applicant into the list of participants. 
46
 See http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/ngo_e.htm. 
47
 Newsletters, brochures and announcements will not be included in the list. 
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The 1996 Guidelines envisaged the possibility for chairpersons of WTO councils and committees 
to meet with NGOs. There are no written procedures that would govern such meetings. They 
usually take place at the initiative of Geneva-based NGOs, which use them as yet another 
opportunity to keep up to date with the developments in WTO negotiations. Sometimes meetings 
are held upon the suggestion of the relevant chairperson or of the WTO Secretariat, but in most 
cases, the WTO Secretariat is not involved in the organisation. The information about upcoming 
meetings is rarely published; it is circulated within NGO networks informally. There is no NGO 
selection but participation is naturally confined to those NGOs that know about the meeting. 
Usually during these meetings NGOs and chairs of relevant councils/committees exchange 
information and views, mostly in relation to ongoing negotiations. Due to the informal nature of 
these meetings, with few exceptions, no reports are issued. 
 
Similar informal meetings take place between NGOs and WTO Secretariat staff from various 
divisions. These may be devoted to negotiations or cover technical issues of interest to NGOs. 
There is no schedule for these meetings; they are organised on an ad hoc basis, but normally 
some WTO-NGO interaction of this nature occurs almost every week. 
 
Additionally, 3-4 times a year, the WTO Secretariat organises presentations of NGO studies or 
publications. These presentations are primarily organized for the benefit of delegates of WTO 
Members. However, whether due to the busy agenda of these delegates or the often technical and 
specific nature of the presentations, they have aroused limited interest to date. 
 
 
6. Informal NGO Advisory Body 
 
 
Unlike some other international organisations, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (‘UNDP’) and the World Bank, the WTO does not have a permanent body through 
which a formal “dialogue” between the WTO Members and civil society, including NGOs, can 
take place. Suggestions to establish such consultative bodies have received little support from 
WTO Members. However, in 2003 the then WTO Director-General, Dr. Supachai Panitchpakdi, 
took a personal initiative to establish the Informal NGO Advisory Body and the Informal 
Business Advisory Body. Both advisory bodies were established as informal bodies because 
under the 1996 Guidelines the Director-General does not have a mandate to formally 
institutionalise relations with NGOs in such a manner.  
 
The Informal NGO Advisory Body, made up of ten high level representatives from NGOs, was 
designed to provide a platform for dialogue between the WTO Director-General (not the WTO 
Members) and NGOs from around the world. To form the Informal NGO Advisory Body, the 
Director-General selected, on a discretionary basis, those NGOs that he considered to be 
influential and broadly representative, and seeking, where possible, to maintain regional balance 
and balance between NGOs from developed and developing countries.
48
 The main function of 
                                                 
48
 Interestingly, Friends of the Earth International and Oxfam International have rejected the invitation to 
become a member, arguably because of fears of criticism from their peers and potential bad 
publicity. Perhaps for the same reason, the NGOs that had agreed to participate asked the 
Director-General to abstain from publicising the existence of the Advisory Body. That is why the 
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the Informal NGO Advisory Body is to advise the WTO Director-General on the WTO-related 
matters and to channel the positions and concerns of civil society on international trade. 
Although the Director-General is not a party to WTO negotiations, he is the Chairman of the 
Trade Negotiations Committee and thus can serve as an intermediary between NGOs and the 
WTO membership. So far, the Informal NGO Advisory Body has met three times (once a year) 
and during these meetings has mostly discussed the state of play in the ongoing trade 
negotiations, with participants exchanging their views and identifying issues of mutual concern. 
Participants have also discussed with the Director-General ways of improving WTO relations 
with civil society. These meetings have not resulted in any specific outcomes, such as official 
meeting reports or NGO statements that would be communicated to the WTO membership, for 
example. 
 
 
7. Involvement in WTO dispute settlement 
 
Settlement of trade disputes between WTO Members is one of the most important and successful 
functions of the WTO. Members, both developed and developing countries, make active use of 
the WTO dispute settlement system. A significant number of disputes dealt with by the WTO 
dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body concerned national environmental legislation 
(US – Gasoline; US – Shrimp), public health legislation (EC – Hormones; EC – Asbestos) and 
other legislation of particular interest to NGOs (EC – Bananas; EC – Tariff Preferences). Not 
surprisingly, NGOs have looked for ways to make their voice heard by panels and the Appellate 
Body. This is not self-evident since WTO proceedings are closed to the public. Consultations, 
panel proceedings and appellate review proceedings are all confidential. Proposals by the 
European Communities and the United States in the context of the Doha negotiations on the 
reform of the DSU to open hearings of panels and the Appellate Body to the public have 
received very little support from other WTO Members. However, in September 2005, at the 
explicit request of the parties to the dispute (the European Communities, the United States and 
Canada), a WTO panel opened, for the first time, its hearings to the public. In the long-standing 
EC - Hormones dispute, the Panel authorized its proceedings were to be broadcasted through 
closed-circuit television at the WTO headquarters to an audience consisting mainly of diplomats, 
NGO representatives, media and academics. Up to 400 people could observe the meetings.
49
 To 
date, this has been the only time that WTO dispute settlement hearings were public and could be 
attended by interested NGOs. While, theoretically, panels could open up their hearings without 
the agreement of the parties to the dispute, it is unlikely that they will do so. More, the parties 
will probably have to take the initiative and request the panel to open up its hearings. Few parties 
are willing to do this. 
 
In a number of disputes, environmental and human rights NGOs, labour unions and industry 
associations have attempted to make themselves heard and to influence the outcome of disputes 
                                                                                                                                                             
WTO website does not include any information on it. Members of the informal NGO Advisory Body include 
Consumers International, Consumer Unity and Trust Society, the International Federation of 
Agricultural Producers, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) International, Third World Network, 
Christian Aid, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Public Services 
International, the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, and the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. See WTO Reporter, 17 June 2003.  
49
 See BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 9, Number 30, 14 September 2005. 
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by submitting unsolicited written briefs, commonly referred to as amicus curiae briefs (‘friend of 
the court’ briefs). NGO briefs can be attached to parties’ submissions or be submitted 
independently. They can serve at least three different functions: (1) providing legal analysis and 
interpretation; (2) providing factual analysis as well as evidence; and (3) placing the trade 
dispute into a broader political and social context.
50
 NGOs can advance arguments WTO 
Members fear using because they are concerned that later, in other disputes, those arguments 
may be used against them.
51
 As of 2003, more than seventy NGOs have submitted amicus curiae 
briefs either to panels or the Appellate Body.
52
 The acceptance by panels and the Appellate Body 
of these amicus curiae briefs  has been controversial and criticised by most WTO Members. 
 
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body came to the conclusion that panels have the authority to 
accept and consider amicus curiae briefs.
53
 It is by no means a right for NGOs and other friends 
of the court that their briefs are accepted and considered (unlike the briefs of parties and third 
parties), but it is the right of panels to do so if they consider it useful to decide the case. A few 
panels in later disputes did, on the basis of this ruling of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp, 
accept and consider amicus curiae briefs. However, in most instances panels refused to accept 
and consider amicus curiae briefs submitted to them.
54
 In US – Lead and Bismuth II, the 
Appellate Body ruled with respect to its own authority to accept and consider amicus curiae 
briefs submitted in appellate review proceedings. It concluded that it had the legal authority to 
decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that it believed to be pertinent and 
useful in rendering its decision. However, in this particular case, the Appellate Body did not find 
the two amicus curiae briefs filed to be useful.
55
 In October 2000, the Appellate Body Division 
hearing the appeal in EC – Asbestos adopted an Additional Procedure, to deal with amicus curiae 
briefs which the Appellate Body expected to receive in great numbers in that dispute.
56
 It 
adopted this Additional Procedure in the ‘interests of fairness and orderly procedure’.
57
 The 
Procedure required applicants to file for leave to submit a brief. The application had to respond 
to a set of questions, among them information on the objectives and financing of the applicant 
and how the proposed brief would make a contribution that is not likely to be repetitive of what 
the parties in the dispute have already said. While eventually the Appellate Body did not give 
any applicant leave to submit its amicus curiae briefs,
58
 most WTO Members were infuriated by 
the Appellate Body’s adoption of the Additional Procedure and its apparent willingness to accept 
and consider amicus curiae briefs (provided certain requirements are fulfilled). At a tumultuous 
Special Meeting of the General Council in November 2000, most Members expressed the 
                                                 
50
 L. Johnson and E. Tuerk, ‘CIEL’s Experience in WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and Complexities from a Practical Point of 
View’ in T. Treves, M. Frigessi di Rattalma, A. Tanzi, A. Fodella, C. Pitea, C. Ragni (eds.), Civil Society, International Courts and 
Compliance Bodies (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2005), pp. 243-260 at p.249. 
51
 S. Charnovitz, ‘Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17  University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Economic Law, 1996,  331, at 353.  
52
 M. Jeffords, ‘Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective Consultation Between The WTO and 
NGOs’, 28 Brooklyn Journal of International Law , 2003, 937, at 961. 
53
 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“US – Shrimp”), 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, paras. 104, 105 and 106. 
54
 Note that the acceptance and consideration of  amicus curiae briefs attached to the submissions of parties and third parties to the 
panel or the Appellate Body are not controversial (anymore). 
55
 Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel 
Products Originating in the United Kingdom (“US – Lead and Bismuth II”), WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 39 and 42. 
56
 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – 
Asbestos”), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, paras. 51-52. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 In response to the form-letter rejections, several NGOs issued a critical press statement. The statement complained that the 
Appellate Body gave no reason for the rejections. Among the signatories to the statement were two large environmental NGOs, the 
WWF, and Greenpeace International. See S. Charnovitz, ‘Opening the WTO to Non-Governmental Interests’, 189. 
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opinion that since there was no specific provision regarding amicus briefs, such briefs should not 
be accepted. In his concluding remarks the Chair of the General Council stated that: ‘in the light 
of the views expressed and in the absence of clear rules, he believed that the Appellate Body 
should exercise extreme caution in future cases until Members had considered what rules were 
needed.’
59
 To date, WTO Members have been unable to adopt any rules on amicus curiae briefs. 
The Appellate Body has repeatedly confirmed its case law on the authority of panels and the 
Appellate Body to accept and consider these briefs. In no appellate proceedings thus far, 
however, has the Appellate Body considered it useful in deciding on an appeal to accept and 
consider amicus curiae briefs submitted to it. 
 
Two additional observations with regard to a possible involvement of NGOs in WTO dispute 
settlement should be made. First, pursuant to Article 13 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, a panel has the right to seek information and technical advice from any 
individual or body which it deems appropriate. Panels could thus call on NGOs for information 
and technical advice. Note, however, that the requirements of the Rules of Conduct for WTO 
dispute settlement, and in particular the requirements of independence and impartiality, also 
applies to all those which a panel calls on for expert information and advice. Second, it is 
accepted since the relevant Appellate Body ruling in EC – Bananas,
60
  that parties and third 
parties are free to determine for themselves the composition of their delegation at hearings of 
panels and the Appellate Body. It is, therefore, possible for a party or third party to include NGO 
representatives in its delegation or, even to retain an NGO representative as its legal counsel.
61
  
 
 
V. Rules and Procedures for the Selection of NGOs 
 
Ever more NGOs with very different objectives wish to be involved in the policy-making, 
policy-implementation, compliance-monitoring and dispute-settlement activities of international 
organizations. For good reason, international organizations want to keep the number of NGOs 
involved in their activities ‘manageable’ and also want to avoid the involvement of NGOs which 
could potentially harm them in their efforts to achieve their objectives. A selection among NGOs 
thus seems to impose itself. Selection is needed to ensure that only NGOs that ‘add value’ to the 
policy-making, policy-implementation, compliance-monitoring and dispute-settlement activities 
‘enjoy’ specific forms of involvement and associated rights. To this end, a number of 
international organisations, and most prominently the United Nations, have elaborate rules on 
accreditation. These rules include: 
• substantive rules setting out the requirements that a NGO must meet to be accredited; and 
• procedural rules for taking decisions regarding accreditation and the subsequent 
monitoring of accredited NGOs. 
 
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 on the ‘Consultative Relationship between the United Nations and 
Non-Governmental Organizations’, already discussed above, is quite specific about the 
                                                 
59
 Emphasis added. See Minutes of the General Council Meeting of 22 November 2000, WT/GC/M/60, dated 23 January 2001, 
para. 120. 
60
 See EC – Bananas, para. 10. This reasoning was later confirmed for panel proceedings. 
61
 NGOs such as International Lawyers and Economists Against Poverty or the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists 
would, in principle, be able to provide parties and third parties with specialized legal expertise much needed in WTO proceedings. 
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requirements which NGOs must meet in order to be accredited and thus conferred consultative 
status. Pursuant to Resolution 1996/31, the NGOs must, first of all, be concerned with matters 
falling within the (very broad) competence of the Council and its subsidiary bodies.
62
 It must be 
able to demonstrate that its programme of work is of direct relevance and can contribute to the 
mission of the United Nations.
63
 The aims and purposes of the NGO must be in conformity with 
the spirit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
64
 Secondly, the NGO must also have 
recognized standing within its field of competence.
65
 Thirdly, the NGO must have an established 
headquarters with an executive officer;
66
 a democratically adopted constitution;
67
 a 
representative and accountable inner structure;
68
 and the authority to speak for its members.
69
 
Fourthly, as regards the funding of the NGO, the basic resources must be derived from either 
national affiliates or from individual members.
70
 Finally, the NGO must attest that it has been in 
existence for at least two years at the date of receipt of its application for consultative status.
71
  
As explicitly stated in Resolution 1996/31, decisions regarding arrangements for consultation 
should be guided by the principle that they are made, on the one hand, for the purpose of 
enabling the Council or one of its subsidiary bodies to secure expert information or advice from 
NGOs having special competence in the relevant subjects, and on the other hand, to enable 
international, regional, sub-regional and national NGOs that represent important elements of 
public opinion to express their views.
72
 Therefore, the arrangements for consultation made with 
each NGO should relate to the subjects in which that NGO has special competence or in which it 
has a special interest.
73
 Consequently, the decisive factor in which form of consultative status 
will be granted (general, special, or roster) is the scope of the NGOs activities and competence. 
For the general status, it must be as broad as, or at least comparable to, that of ECOSOC; for 
special status the NGO’s scope must cover a few relevant fields; for Roster status, a narrower 
scope is permitted. Finally, in selecting NGOs, ECOSOC must to the extent possible, encourage 
the participation of NGOs, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine 
involvement of NGOs from all regions and areas of the world.
74
 
 
As set out in detail in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, an NGO must to obtain consultative status 
with ECOSOC and/or its subsidiary bodies submit an application, which is then reviewed by 
ECOSOC’s Committee on NGOs (or NGO Committee). The NGO Committee consists of 19 
Member States that are elected every four years by the Council on the basis of equitable 
geographical representation.
75
 The Committee, which meets twice each year, in practice discusses 
all new applications during informal meetings prior to its formal sessions. NGO applications are 
grouped into two lists. List 1 includes ‘unproblematic’ NGOs; List 2 features those NGOs that 
                                                 
62
 Resolution 1996/312 of the Economic and Social Council of 5 July 1996 on the ‘Consultative Relationship between the United 
Nations and Non-Governmental Organizations’, UN Document E/1996/31, para. 1. 
63
 Ibid., paras. 3 and 8. 
64
 Ibid., para. 2. This requirement may be used to exclude NGOs that advocate violence, racial discrimination or disrespect for 
human rights.  
65
 Ibid., para. 9. 
66
 Ibid., para. 10. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Ibid., para. 12. 
69
 Ibid, para. 11. 
70
 Ibid, para. 13. This requirement may be waived if an NGO provides a satisfactory explanation in accordance with paragraph 13.  
71
 Ibid., para. 61 (h). 
72
 Ibid., para. 20. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid., para. 5 
75
 Ibid., para. 60 
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gave rise to questions from one or more delegations. These questions are sent to the NGOs 
concerned so that they may respond until the beginning of the formal session of the NGO 
Committee.
76
 If Member States are not satisfied with answers received from a particular NGO, its 
application is deferred and additional questions are posed. After deliberations on each NGO, the 
chairperson of the Committee usually suggests recommending special consultative status and if 
there are no objections or proposals to change the type of status (into general or Roster) from 
Member States, this recommendation will be transmitted to ECOSOC for final approval.  In 
difficult cases, the NGO Committee may turn to voting before submitting their recommendation. 
At its session in January 2006, the NGO Committee considered 99 NGOs and recommended that 
60 were put on List 1 and 39 on List 2. The final decision is taken by ECOSOC itself.  
An NGO granted general or special consultative status with ECOSOC is under an obligation to 
submit a report on its activities every four years.
77
 This report, commonly referred to as the 
quadrennial report, allows the NGO Committee to review whether the NGO concerned continues 
to satisfy the substantive criteria of consultative status as set out above. If the Committee is of 
the opinion that this is not the case, it can recommend to ECOSOC the reclassification, the 
suspension (for up to three years) or withdrawal of the NGOs consultative status.
78
  To date, 
ECOSOC has suspended or withdrawn the consultative status of only a few NGOs.  
 
In sharp contrast with the elaborate ECOSOC substantive and procedural rules on accreditation,  
WTO law provides for virtually no rules to ensure that the WTO only engages with NGOs that 
‘add value’ to its policy-making, policy-implementation, compliance-monitoring and dispute-
settlement activities. Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement merely states that the WTO should 
restrict its engagement to NGOs ‘concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’.  The 
1996 Guidelines do not provide for any further accreditation requirements or selection criteria. 
There are also no specific procedural rules for the decisions on accreditation.   
 
When the WTO was first confronted with the problem of accrediting NGOs on the occasion of 
the first Session of the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996, the WTO 
Secretariat accredited all non-profit NGOs that could point to activities related to those of the 
WTO. The applicant-NGOs were not submitted to any further examination of their objectives, 
membership, institutional structure or financing.
79
 Apart from the criterion of ‘WTO-related 
activities’, the only additional accreditation criterion applied at the time was the ‘non-profit 
                                                 
76
 In many instances, these questions have little to do with the compliance of the NGO with the established accreditation criteria, but 
have to do more with political sensitivities of particular states. To give just one example, at the January 2006 session of the NGO 
Committee, Cuba posed the question to an NGO that focused on human rights violations ‘in the Global South’ whether this NGO 
considered that there were no human rights violations ‘in the Global North’. Although this NGO eventually was granted special 
consultative status, the example is illustrative. 
77
 Ibid., para. 61 (c) Under ‘exceptional circumstances’, the NGO Committee can ask for a report between the regular reporting 
dates. The Committee may ask for such special report when it is informed of an act or a pattern of acts of the NGO concerned which 
could lead to suspension or withdrawal of the consultative status. See ibid. 
78
 There are three cases in which the consultative status of an NGO may be suspended for up to three years or withdrawn:  
(1) if an NGO clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, 
including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with 
Charter’s purposes and principles;   
(2) if there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from internationally recognized criminal activities 
such as illicit drugs trade, money-laundering or illegal arms trade;  
(3) if, within the preceding three years an organization did not make any positive or effective contributions to the work of the 
United Nations and, in particular, to the work of  ECOSOC or its subsidiary organs (Ibid., para. 57). 
79
 It has been suggested that such examination was beyond the resources of the WTO Secretariat. 
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character’ of the NGO. Private companies and law firms were refused accreditation on this 
basis.  
 
This practice continued at subsequent Sessions of the Ministerial Conference. The WTO 
Secretariat merely checked the WTO-related nature of the activities of the applicant NGO and its 
non-profit character.
80
 Rather than a system of selection and accreditation of NGOs, the WTO 
applies in fact a simple system of ad hoc registration for one event, namely the bi-annual Session 
of the Ministerial Conference. This registration/accreditation system of NGOs for the bi-annual 
sessions of the Ministerial Conference is basically left to the discretion of the WTO Secretariat, 
although the WTO General Council, of course, can address any issue concerning 
accreditation/registration that may arise in the run-up to a session of the Ministerial 
Conference.
81
 Note that despite these rather lax criteria for accreditation/registration, only 1,065 
NGOs out of roughly 1,630 applicants were accredited for the 2005 Hong Kong Session of the 
Ministerial Conference. Of those not accredited, about 220 requests for accreditation were not 
processed because of lack of further response or information from NGOs. The remaining 
requests were refused for a variety of reasons (no or insufficient evidence of WTO-related 
activities or of the non-profit character).  Due to the high number of requests for registration for 
the Hong Kong Session of the Ministerial Conference, the WTO was stricter in sieving 
applications than was customary for earlier Sessions. Reportedly, applications from pure 
research institutions or student associations, which do not have any advocacy functions, or 
similar features that usually characterise NGOs, were refused. 
 
While the quasi-absence of WTO rules and procedures for the selection of NGOs should be 
noted with concern, it could be argued that as long as NGO involvement in WTO activities 
remains as modest as it currently is, there is very little use for elaborate accreditation rules and 
procedures. The 2005 Sutherland Report on ‘The Future of the World Trade Organization’ noted 
in this respect that a formal system of accreditation might have ‘attractions’ (for example, 
ensuring that ‘responsible NGOs get the advantage of a closer relationship with the WTO’), it 
would impose a continuing bureaucratic burden to receive, sieve and make judgments about 
candidate NGOs.
82
  As long as NGOs have no consultative status with the WTO (i.e. not allowed 
to participate in the meetings of WTO bodies), it is indeed doubtful whether a formal system of 
accreditation is ‘a worthy investment for a small organisation with a limited budget’.
83
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 To prove its non-profit character, an NGO is required to produce registration documents or a charter pointing to the aims of the 
organisation. If these are not available, the WTO requires at least production of documents that would prove that the organisation 
formally exists. Strictly speaking, the non-profit character is not a criterion for selection among NGOs but rather a feature 
characteristic of all NGOs that distinguishes them from other types of organisations. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
When one compares the extent of current WTO engagement with NGOs with the extent of 
GATT or early WTO engagement with NGOs, it is clear that big strides forward have been 
made. Largely due to the efforts of the WTO Secretariat, the relations between the WTO and 
NGOs are currently more meaningful, more constructive and less antagonistic than ever before. 
The involvement of NGOs in the policy-making, policy-implementation, compliance-monitoring 
and dispute-settlement activities of the WTO remains, however, quite modest. The potential of 
Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement has definitely not been exploited by the WTO Members. As 
stated in the 1996 Guidelines, it was and still is not ‘possible for NGOs to be directly involved in 
the work of the WTO or its meetings.’
84
 With the exception of the formal plenary meeting of the 
Ministerial Conference, NGOs are not allowed to attend – let alone – actively participate in any 
meeting of WTO bodies. 
 
When addressing the question whether there is a need and/or scope for more NGO involvement 
in the activities of the WTO, the 2005 Sutherland Report on ‘The Future of the World Trade 
Organization’ first noted (in line with the view held by most – if not all – WTO Members) that 
the primary responsibility for engaging civil society in trade policy matters rests not with the 
WTO but with its Members.
85
 The Sutherland Report also noted that while all international 
organisations shared common objectives in the pursuit of transparency, each organisation’s 
peculiar mandate and structure might call for specific objectives, forms of involvement and the 
choice of civil society organisations with whom to collaborate.
86
 According to the Sutherland 
Report, within the limited bounds of an institution, such as the WTO, founded on contractual 
commitments negotiated among governments, there are therefore limits to how much further the 
WTO can go in involving NGOs in its deliberations and processes.
87
 The Sutherland Report 
called upon the WTO Members to develop a new set of clearer guidelines for the relations of the 
WTO Secretariat with NGOs and to scale up the administrative capacity and financial resources 
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of the WTO Secretariat.
88
 The Sutherland Report referred to new ‘systematic and in-depth 
relations’ between the WTO Secretariat and NGOs but was silent about the types of activities 
that such relations could comprise. Such activities could include, for example, joint WTO 
Secretariat-NGO research projects and NGO involvement in WTO training and technical 
assistance programmes. The Sutherland Report, however, did not offer any substantial 
improvements in the degree of WTO’s engagement with NGOs. Rather, it called for 
streamlining and further developing the existing forms of engagement, with an emphasis on the 
Secretariat’s (as opposed to WTO membership’s) relations with NGOs. 
 
While appreciating the wisdom of limiting proposal for reform to ‘realizable’ reforms, rather 
than proposing more substantial changes for which there is no support anyway, the Sutherland 
Report shows a regrettable lack of ambition in the area of dialogue with civil society.  It could 
be argued that the WTO can and should engage with NGOs, and allow for NGO involvement, 
more than it currently does. Why can (selected) NGOs not have observer/consultative status in 
WTO bodies? In the United Nations, UNCTAD, the ILO, WIPO and other international 
organizations that deal with economic matters, NGOs have such status and participate in the 
meetings of the bodies of these organisations. Why is this not possible in the WTO? Does the 
intergovernmental character of the WTO prevent granting NGOs observer/consultative status? 
Would further engagement with NGOs, in particular, by allowing (selected) NGOs to participate 
in formal meetings of its bodies, be counterproductive to the conduct of negotiations within the 
WTO? The Report recognizes that it is important that the WTO is perceived as democratic and 
transparent and that dialogue with civil society would help to promote the image of the WTO as 
an effective and equitable organization. Why then does the Report not argue for more 
engagement with civil society? Justified concerns about the legitimacy, accountability, and the 
politics of NGOs could be taken away, or at least mitigated, by introducing a system of 
accreditation. The Sutherland Report correctly observes that NGO involvement must have its 
limits, but these limits have not been reached yet. The glass is still half-empty. 
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